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found, however, in Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners, 294 U. S.
608. There an act of the State of Oregon almost identical in its terms was held by
the United States Supreme Court not to deny the due process guaranteed under the
Fourteenth Amendment nor to impair the obligation of any advertising contracts
already made when the act became effective. The dental profession is bound to
enjoy a larger measure of public esteem as a result of this act.
H. S. Irwin.

DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
At the last session of the General Assembly, Act No. 357 was passed and
approved on June 5, 1937. This act materially changes some of the law relating
to criminal procedure. The act provides that when a defendant demurs to the evidence submitted by the Commonwealth at the close of the Commonwealth's case, the
demurrer shall be deemed an admission of the facts that the evidence tends to
prove or the inferences reasonably deducible therefrom only for the purpose of
deciding upon such demurrer, and if the court decides against the defendant
on the demurrer, the decision shall be interlocutory only and the case shall proceed as if the demurrer had not been made.'
This changes the preexisting common law and brings the criminal procedure into conformity with the civil practice under the Practice Act of 1915.
Under the Practice Act when a defendant files what is known as a statutory demurrer to the plaintiff's statement of claim, which is overruled, he is given fifteen days
within which to file a supplemental affidavit of defense to the averments of fact. 2
The result in both cases is now that the defendant loses nothing by his demurrer
in the event it is overruled.
The common law rule in the case of the demurrer to the evidence in a
criminal case was that "where the defendant demurs to the evidence it is proper for
the court to dismiss the jury and render judgment.' ' The result of this rule was
that frequently the demurrer was overruled and the court proceeded to render
judgment, thereby, in a sense, depriving the defendant of a jury trial, because of
the error of his counsel in making the demurrer. It was said, "in criminal cases
a demurrer to the evidence of the Commonwealth admits all the facts which the
evidence tends to prove, and all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom.' 4
This same result followed when a defendant demurred to the evidence in a
civil suit. He was deemed to admit every inference and conclusion which the
'Act No. 357, approved June 5, 1937.
2Act of May 14, 1915, P. L. 483, Section 20.
8Commonwealth v. Parr, 5 W. & S. 345 (1843).
4
Commonwealth v. Parr, supra.
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jury might deduce from the evidence. 5 This practice has been abandoned by the
effect of the act of March 11, 1875, P. L. 6 which provided for the entry of a
nonsuit in such a situation. The effect of a motion for a nonsuit differs from a
demurrer to evidence, in that judgment cannot be given for the plaintiff should
the court think the case made out, but in that case the nonsuit will be refused and
the case given to the jury.6 The earliest case on the subject was that of Commonwealth v Parr, 1843, and this rule has been adhered to and followed by many slibsequent cases, 7 the latest of which is Commonwealth v. Robinson decided in 1935.6
D. F. Shughart

COMPUTATION OF CRIMINAL SENTENCES
Act No. 283 of the past session of the General Assembly contains provisions
for the computation of sentences for criminal offenses.' The first section of this

act provides that in the event the person being sentenced is being held in custody at the time of the sentence in default of bail or otherwise, the sentence shall
begin to run from the date of commitment. Section 2 of the act defines the date of
commitment for the offense for which the sentence is imposed. For example, if the

person were in prison for two months prior to sentence in default of bail and then
was sentenced to one year he would have but ten months to serve after sentence.

Prior to the act it seems to have been the practice to use discretion in crediting the
defendant with time spent in custody before sentence. By the act it is now mandatory.
The clause in section 1 "or otherwise" following the terms "in default of
bail," by the act does not include the case where the person was in prison serving a prior sentence. In such case the act provides that the court may in its
discretion direct that, first, the new sentence shall begin to run and be computed
from the date of imposition thereof, or second, shall begin to run from the expiration of such other sentence or sentences. It is submitted that the exception
is the product of sound judgment, since it prevents a second offender from receiving the benefit of a shortened sentence because of prior infractions. The
provision for the use of the discretion of the court provides the necessary relief
in cases where it might be appropriate to allow the sentences to run concurrently.
613 Pepper & Lewis Dig. of Decisions 23154, and cases cited therein.

5.
6Supra,
7
Commonwealth v. Kolsby, 100 Pa. Super. Ct. 596; Commonwealth v. Nathan, 93 Pa. Super.
Ct. 193; Commonwealth v. Smith, 97 Pa. Super. Ct. 157; Commonwealth v. Beech, 97 Pa. Super. Ct.
157; Commonwealth v. Williams, 71 Pa. Super. Ct. 311.
SCommonwealth v. Robinson, 317 Pa. 321 (1935).
lAct No. 283-approved

May 28, 1937.

